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arising under local or special provisions of the State Constitution. In Shannon v. Morgan City Harbor & Terminal District23
it was held that a constitutional amendment specifically providing for the creation of the harbor district and authorizing the
issuance of bonds without a vote of the property owners in the
district superseded all other general provisions of the Constitution relative to the issuance of bonds. In Short & Murrell v. Department of Highways2 4 it was held that the power of the Board
of Highways "to establish, construct, extend, improve, maintain
and regulate the use of the State highways and bridges," 25 authorized it to direct the Highway Department to enter into contracts looking toward the construction of a proposed office building to house the departmental activities. In Ewell v. Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University,26 the court held that
to the extent that sums collected for licenses, fees, and penalties
under the provisions of fertilizer, 27 feed,2 8 and pesticide 29 statutes exceeded the cost of administering these measures, the statutes were to be regarded as revenue levies. As a consequnce, it
was proper for the University, to whom the excess revenue was
dedicated, to bond the revenue and use the sums thus acquired for
the purpose of constructing a building to house the activities of
the state chemist, charged with the duty of enforcing these
measures.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Henry G. McMahon*
OFFICERS AND OTHER PERSONNEL

The officers of the Town of Mansura were elected for a twoyear term on June 12, 1956. At the same time the electorate of
the town voted to have their municipal affairs regulated in the
future by the Lawrason Act.' Under the pertinent provision of
this statute, officers of a municipality in office when it elects
to come under the provisions of the Lawrason Act retain their
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

234 La. 1035, 102 So.2d 446 (1958).
233 La. 735, 98 So.2d 170 (1957).
LA. CONST. art. VI, § 19.1.
234 La. 419, 100 So.2d 221 (1958).
LA. R.S. 3:1311 et seq. (1950).
Id. 3:1891 et seq.
Id. 3:1601 et seq.

*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. LA. R.S. 33:321 et seq. (1950).
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offices until the first general municipal elections held in accordance with the provisions of the statute.2 The next general municipal elections were held, under the Lawrason Act, in June of
1957, but no municipal election was called or held in Mansura.
As a result the Attorney General ruled that these municipal offices were vacant, and the Governor appointed the then incumbents for another term. In State ex rel. Lemoine v. Municipal
Democratic Executive Committee3 six electors of the municipality sought to mandamus the defendant committee to call a municipal election on June 12, 1958. The trial judge agreed with
the relators' contention that the terms of the officers appointed
by the Governor expired on July 1, 1958, and issued the mandamus. Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
reversed. The provisions of another section of the Lawrason
Act, 4 apparently not considered by the trial court, provided that
municipal officers are elected for four-year terms. The terms of
the municipal offices in question would not expire until July 1,
1961.
Slicho v. New Orleans5 is a decision of far-reaching importance to the local government law of the state. The plaintiff
therein, a detective on the police force of the defendant city,
sought injunctive relief to prevent his discharge because of his
refusal to answer questions, on the ground that he might incriminate himself, asked by the Intelligence Division of the Internal
Revenue Service. The plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional a section of the Constitution of
Louisiana 6 providing that such conduct was sufficient grounds
for his discharge, pleading its violation of the due process clause
of. the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff as
prayed for. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issues
were under the exclusive cognizance of the Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans, and that the courts were
without jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.
In support of its position, the Supreme Court pointed out
that any civil servant of the city aggrieved by an act of his ap2. LA. R.S. 33:383 (1950).
3. 234 La. 969, 102 So.2d 234 (1958).
4. LA. R.S. 33:383 (1950).
5. 235 La. 305, 103 So.2d 454 (1958). This case was consolidated for trial
and argument on appeal with Vairin v. New Orleans, 235 La. 313, 103 So.2d 457
(1958).
6. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.
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pointing authority may take his complaint to the Civil Service
Commission, which is given exclusive jurisdiction to hear it. The
trial court had concluded that the pertinent section of the State
Constitution 7 granted to the Commission the exclusive right to
hear "appeals"; and that since this was a suit for a declaratory
judgment it did not constitute any appeal from disciplinary
action taken by the appointing authority. The appellate court
swept this contention aside with the following language:
"The word 'appeal' as used in the constitutional amendment is not intended to signify a review by a judicial body of
the action taken by another judicial body; it is used in the
sense that the commissions are established tribunals wherein
all civil servants must file their complaints, the hearing before the appropriate commission being the first adversary
proceeding of a judicial nature available to the complainant." S
The fourth case in this area of local government law involved
only an issue of fact.9
In Klump v. Board of Trustees, ° the widow of a former captain in the New Orleans Fire Department, alleging that her husband died in the performance of his official duties, sued to recover a pension. Prior to trial of the case, the plaintiff died, and
her heirs were substituted as parties plaintiff, and the demand
was reduced to the amount which would have been due the original plaintiff prior to her death. The trial court dismissed the
suit, and held: (1) the action had not abated on the death of the
plaintiff, insofar as the pension which might have accrued prior
to her death was concerned; and (2) the deceased died of natural causes.
The Supreme Court affirmed on the second point decided by
the trial court, and refused to consider the issue of abatement of
the action. After a study of the legislative history of the pertinent statute, through a careful analysis of its various amendments and source provisions, the court concluded that a widow
was not entitled to a pension unless her husband died in the performance of his duties as a result of an accident. The deceased
admittedly died of a heart attack, and since he sustained the
7. Ibid.
8. 103 So.2d at 457.
9. Mayerhafer v. Department of Police of the City of New Orleans, 104 So.2d
163: (La. 1958). There, the Supreme Court, with one Justice dissenting, reversed
the action Of the Civil Service Commission which upheld the discharge of the plaintiff police captain.
10. 234 La. 665, 101 So.2d 195 (1958).
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fatal attack after the performance of light and non-strenuous
duties, the appellate court agreed with the court below that he
died from natural causes, and not as a result of an accident. A
prior decision invoked by the plaintiffs was differentiated on the
ground that there the fireman had died as a result of a heart attack superinduced by strenuous and violent physical activities
while fighting a fire.
FINANCE

The plaintiffs in Bell v. Shreveport" sought a judgment annulling an ordinance imposing assessments on abutting property
to cover a portion of the costs of street paving. In accordance
with the authorizing statutory provisions, the city council gave
public notice of its intention to pave a portion of one of its
streets, the work to be done under competitive bidding, with twothirds of the cost thereof to be assessed against the abutting
property. Subsequently, the city council approved plans and
specifications for the work prepared by the city engineer, and
ordered that bids be received for the work to be done in accordance therewith. The lowest bid submitted was accepted, the work
was completed, and by ordinance two-thirds of the total cost was
assessed against the abutting property.
The six plaintiffs, owners of abutting property affected, asserted the nullity of the assessment ordinance on the ground that
the paving contract was illegal. It was contended that the statute under which the work was done and the assessments levied
required acceptance of a contract based on a "turnkey job," while
the council had accepted a contract based on a "unit price" bid.
As a result, the plaintiffs asserted, the total cost of the work had
exceeded the bid price by $14,369.
. A judgment dismissing the suit was affirmed by
the Supreme
of comthe
basis
that
held
Court. Both trial and appellate courts
petition between the bidders was not in the estimate of total
costs submitted, but rather in the unit price bids offered. It was
found that the items which made up the difference between the
total cost and the estimated total bid price accepted consisted of
minor and immaterial alterations in the work as it progressed,
made necessary because of certain obstacles and conditions encountered which had not been foreseen.
11. 234 La. 607, 100 So.2d 883 (1958).

